determined as well as contextually; the ‘uses’ will change, new elements of ‘what it is’ will be usurped, utilized or hidden. In this sense there should always be a notion of the future within any definition of an object or concept (Heidegger knew this\textsuperscript{13}). To assimilate—ergo—also means to embody one or a series of relations in order to see where those relations go. Similar to Nietzsche’s metaphor of the tightrope walker stretched ‘between the animal and the ‘over-man’,\textsuperscript{14} we are stretched between models of assimilation and how we assimilate and further these assimilations ourselves. To assimilate—then—is also to assimilate the present (or more simply time) into the nature of being (ontology).

Assimilations will always try and continue assimilating (people, itself or anything it can), sometimes relapsing into mere repetition (when the coffee cup falls to the floor the spoon remains spinning around the cup as if it were stirring itself, the foam holds itself near the rim, the pop song has not gone away—another customer is singing it, it appears on the radio again etc.). Assimilations ‘blind’ process uses itself and its subjects as its vital force which keeps it active. The consequence of this is that it will ignorantly propel itself from a process always anterior to (before) its awareness of any new event which may cause to disrupt it (the basketball will always remain bouncing even when we have neglected playing and have cast it aside). Yes there are some new events that an old assimilation can further assimilate (this is the true nature of an alien conformity, consistency, continuity which we experience in day to day life, and which we help bind together). However the new can always confound any assimilation, can always transport it, or (most commonly) can always demand of assimilation new relations between hitherto unconnected spheres (of culture, language, being, experience, art, poetry).

Assimilation, Neurosis and Tautology

This essay will define and clarify the two terms I use most frequently to describe my philosophy and the process that reality is undergoing (indeed the processes that create reality for us in the last instance). Those terms are assimilation and neurosis. Before I explain to you what they are and why they are so indispensable to me I will first explain to you what they are not. Assimilation and neurosis are not the same as Heidegger’s distinction between ‘present-at-hand’ and ‘ready-to-hand’ found in his magnum opus \textit{Being and Time}.\textsuperscript{15} In many ways assimilation and neurosis can be seen as a reversal of this distinction. Neurosis is precisely that which shows itself to us in everyday consciousness; the desperate reflexes and associations we have that create and register our semiotic and semantic environment and the people within it,

\textsuperscript{13}See Heidegger, Martin, \textit{Being and Time}, especially his notion of ecstatic temporality and his distinction between ‘ready-to-hand’ and ‘present-to-hand’ first published in 1927.

\textsuperscript{14}Nietzsche (1974).

\textsuperscript{15}Heidegger (1978).
disclosing itself even deeper as a neurosis for various states of pleasure, pain, well-being, all projects we participate in, and even the avid generation of meaning itself. Before you protest and ask why such is ‘neurotic’—apart from the plain fact that such guarantors of meaning and value do not exist outside of the registers of the mind (the natural sciences do not use the category of ‘meaning’ to help them uncover various phenomena)—I have shown throughout this book that there is no other criteria or condition that answers for them (there is nothing teleological, mechanistic, rational, logical, positivist, biological about them). Neurosis is a reversal of Heidegger’s ‘present-at-hand’ definition because although it is a reflective, cognitive trait, such is determined by neurosis itself (flowing through us as it were) conditioning and characterizing reflection itself (already undergoing processes that we aren’t completely conscious of or cannot understand) and is not determined through some Promethean fallacy of a static, invincible conceptual map in the brain that comprehends the apprehended (this is Heidegger’s hangover from Kant) which he calls the ‘as-structure’ of experience (experiencing the world ‘as’ something specific/theoretical/conceptual). We should not equate the experience of neurosis as a cold, ‘present-at-hand’ procedure which retards the real ‘Being’ of dynamic processes. We should acknowledge this because another aspect of neurosis is that it manifests in us whether we want it to or not, whether we have access to intentionality or not (this is it’s properly psychological definition). Hence the ‘as-structure’ of experience (human’s conditioning what we see ‘as’ such and such) is down to neurosis (and, as we shall see later, assimilation) and any effort to own this neurosis or equate it specifically with human intentionality and a ‘metaphysics of presence’ is futile. The criteria under which we see an object is fulfilled through a relationship between assimilation and neurosis. Concepts are forming and informing our lives whether we like it or not, and the last humanist attempt to contain and repress this factory of production is to create a dichotomy called ‘present-at-hand’ and ‘ready-to-hand’; assimilations are assimilating whether we like it or not, and neuroses are proliferating whether we like or not.

Another blow to the Heideggerian dichotomy is that every ‘ready-to-hand’ procedure in entities (‘equipment’) must always already be pre-figured or must relate in a certain way, hence, the modes which entities interact with other entities (whether human or non-human) is already a type of ‘present-at-hand’ activity. Philosophers as varied as Leibniz, Giordano Bruno and Iain Hamilton Grant show us that matter is not a neutral substance waiting to be endowed with form or phenomena but is prefigured (whether through individual ‘micro’ relations that constitute the illusion of neutrality (as in Leibniz) or whether through embedding the potentiality of all forms within matter (such as Bruno’s mater-materia).\(^{18}\)

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\(^{16}\)For more information on this ‘as structure’ of experience please see Dreyfus and Wrathall (2005), especially pp. 151–154.

\(^{17}\)See Derrida, Jacques, for a critique of this ‘metaphysics of presence’ (i.e. a critique of the privileging of the present/presence in relation to the production of knowledge). Derrida (1984).

\(^{18}\)For more information on this concept see de Quincey (2002).
Regarding another philosopher who seems worlds away from this trajectory, Graham Harman would add that a rock hitting another rock does so as a ‘present-at-hand’ thing. For Being to be underway it cannot be blindly monistic but pluralistically constructivist. Everything must be aware of the relations that prefigure it (the proper rival to Heidegger is Hegel).

**Two Forms of Assimilation: The Tautological and the Exotic**

**Tautological Assimilation (Urban Assimilation) and Its Two Powers of Orientation and Identification**

The world of assimilation can be further broken up into two realms. The most acceptable realm of assimilation can be found in the urban environment. Assimilation occurs when we create something with a purpose. When we create something with a purpose we cannot simply stop its purpose when we do not need to use it (the house will remain serving its purpose even if we are on holiday, the light bulb will stay on—illuminating everything in its sight—if we have left it on unknowingly etc.). As Sartre horrifically depicted, our world is fettered by such objects, and the only objects that seem to defy the procedure of essence to existence is us humans. In other words, when we look around ourselves all we see are objects that have been made with essence (or purpose) in mind; the door, the window, the chair, our clothes, the roads, the steps, the hundreds of objects orienting our life. These objects assimilate us on a day-to-day basis. They not only determine our actions (how we move, how we interact, what we depend on, what sets our content of thought, what we are addicted to etc.) but sink into our physical and conceptual habits and become things that we identify ourselves with; the tennis player is assimilated by his interaction with the tennis court, tennis racket, etiquette of tennis matches etc. but is also characterized by these objects—he is a tennis player. This two-fold power of assimilation (orientation and identification) exists everywhere and no-one can escape it, even if one is pluralistically assimilated by different objects/identities, even the rebellious/anarchistic subject is assimilated that way.

As laid out in my essay Concept, Object, Phenomenology, Assimilation, Neurosis this predicament is created by a sort of techne of Kant’s philosophy. In other words, the success of Kant’s conceptual classification of the world—through a system of categories—is rejuvenated in the external world itself through the making, crafting of concepts into objects which hold conceptual content, which mirror concepts back to the subject, just like how concepts mirror the legitimacy of objects in Kant’s philosophical project. I often call this tautology. This is how—on the surface—assimilation works; we must first know the kettle ‘as’ something (or

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how it works); it will boil water, has a handle which will fit within our hands, is pourable into a ‘cup’, which will make coffee, which will wake me up etc. and only then will we see it ‘as’ kettle. This ‘as’—as I have mentioned—is not a neutral, objective seat of reflection but a battlefield of forces; the object assimilating the subject, creating new assimilations (think of Joseph Kosuth’s ‘One and Three Chairs’ 1965\(^21\)), think of how a table’s ‘use’ spreads out to that of the children whispering underneath it, to the cat rubbing its neck against it, to the angry guest smashing his fist upon it, to the drunken guest resting her face upon the surface of it etc. The neurosis of the individual (which we will speak about later) also has a sort of ‘magic’ within it—to prioritize and order passages of personal meanings within his/her consciousness without affecting the ‘order of things’ that are assimilating.

There should be something extremely determinate and obnoxious about this epoch of Being. Heidegger was not wrong when he showed that representation does not factor in the conscious interaction (not observation) we have with objects. We interact with objects due to their ‘use’ and not what they represent, and this interaction is heavily embedded within a routine of ‘custom’ (not so far away from Hume’s definition\(^22\)). This—however—should not be seen as some form of liberation from the cages of representationalism that Kant allocated but rather a form of blind obedience to the use over the representation, to the point where representation disappears (now this disappearance of representation does sound like Heidegger).

As far as I’m concerned, this readiness to emerge ourselves into the ‘invisible equipment’ of tautological objects as pragmatism gets us nowhere intellectually or aesthetically. It is a form of inertia. But assimilation and neurosis (being the powers that got us into this mess) are the only powers that can get us out (I will explain in due time). To discern—outside of the tautology—is what we must do. Let us reiterate the tautology (this tautology shows us how neurosis and assimilation effect one another—albeit in this case—a cyclical way). The connection of neurosis to assimilation: for an ‘object’ to be granted intentional assimilative powers we must first put the ‘concept’ there—its essence must precede its existence. If there were no concept we would not interact with the ‘object’ as ‘such and such’ and the ‘object’ would not ‘hold’ the power of this ‘as’. The idea of a car, its form and function, is made and expressed by the car. They appear as the same thing. What else is a car behind or beyond the concept/use we give it?\(^23\) Yes, when we ‘use’ something in this tautological fashion other assimilations and neuroses are repressed (alternative neuroses and assimilations disappear for this master-relation/assimilation of concept and object, subject and car, into ‘car-driver’). The difference I have with Heidegger is that

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\(^{21}\)This is an artwork showing three different ‘representations’ of a chair through three different mediums.

\(^{22}\)See Hume (2008).

\(^{23}\)In my essay Concept, Object, Phenomena, Neurosis, Assimilation I argue against the merging of concept and object exhaustively and attempt to locate them as two distinct things whilst still showing how they force productive relations between them. It is this decision to exhaustively merge the concept with the object that makes us blind to other processes behind this conflation and makes our participation with such ‘concept-objects’ (tautologies) blind and ignorant.

cjohns@lincoln.ac.uk
non-tautological (exotic) assimilation forces us to see something ‘as’, it conditions the ‘as’ structure of experience, and does not come about through the ‘as’ structure of experience (our decision to reflect upon things). In other words, non-conceptual assimilation is always witnessed as a form of interference with a task. Something does not appear when it has broken (this Heideggerian notion is a negative notion that designates lack as what shows itself). Assimilation does not appear through the failures of human tautological tasks (appearing as conspicuous, obtrusive or obstinate as Heidegger defines them). For example, when we have allocated a ‘concept’ to an ‘object’ in Nature qua techne (for example chopping down a tree to make a boat) we are at our most comfortable and ignorant. All accidental features, all passing situations, are thrust aside for the task-in-hand. If there is a strange insect, some indiscernible ooze or slime, we just wipe it out of the way and keep going with our task. All exotic assimilation has been repressed for the master relation that neurosis and assimilation have agreed on (like a contract). Exotic assimilation occurs as a nuisance which stifles or retards the subject during his task-in-hand. Instead of comfort, the opposite, fear, takes shape; in nature we fear those assimilations that we try to swat out the way (like cobwebs). We feel at once alien to the world, and our superimposition of projects stops acting as the comfortable bedrock it once did. This is the world of assimilation without a correlation of concept or use attached to it (without tautology). A concept may be added but in no way can it exhaust its genesis and reality—its power to assimilate regardless of our lack of finding a use for it or concept. This is a realist take on assimilation but also a positive account of assimilation as opposed to negative. It is positive because it forces itself into consciousness as a positively charged ‘thing’ externally, and does not merely appear inside the tautology when some human process is thwarted or broken. Before we look into these types of assimilations let us look at the way tautological assimilations (in the urban environment) can unbind themselves from tautology.

Tautological Assimilation Undone

Tautological assimilation undone usually strikes in two ways.

1

Firstly, the unbinding occurs when an object remains assimilative even when the concept/use has no pertinence anymore/has been made redundant. The basketball stays bouncing when we have tossed it aside and have moved onto another task, the balloon floats more unwaveringly than ever before when the child has let go of it, the toy aeroplane in the sky is still being an aeroplane when the navigator addresses someone at the barbecue, in the film The Sixth Sense the character Cole Sear still puts on his dead father’s watch every morning even though the concept/use it was given does not correspond to it anymore (the watch has been broken for years and hence does not tell the time), in-fact, even the reverse exists; any working clock still remains ticking even when we do not glance at it to view the time. The public
telephone box assimilates me to stand a certain way, to hunch, to participate in a certain custom regardless of me ‘using’ it to get out of the rain. Something of its use stays in the object. Not necessarily some metaphysical residue or accretion but rather simply its architecture remains intentional to us (or itself). Art is a perfect example of an object which assimilates regardless of its conceptual definition or use (especially ancient ‘art’) whereby the concept and use—broadly sketched out for the object—and briefly embodying these concepts and uses—have long disappeared whilst still holding an assimilative quality (an aura^24?).

For all the above cases—on the surface—assimilation has the capacity to assimilate only because our neurosis (our relation to that object) still lingers on in us (in ‘it’), in our reflexes. Hence the power of the object did not capture us completely through its own power. The tautology of the public phone box is unbound now, has been made redundant by technology, history, culture or personal experience, yet when the tautological correspondence falls apart into two halves because of their mutual redundancy, the two halves (subject-object) hold the residue of the activity as if two magnets attracting each other. As much of my early writings describe^25—this attractive residue can also hold various repulsive relations too (based on juxtaposition, mutation, new-use etc.): goodness knows what the public telephone box has become since its correlation which inaugurated its use; sites for sexual activity, smoking, graffiti, meaningful conversations, a place to sleep, a place for animals to shelter, a spider’s home etc. Can something ever stop being assimilative in this broad and pluralistic respect? I don’t think so.

The dynamics between how much the object assimilates the subject and how much the subject plays slave to these self-made assimilations is very ambiguous. In a way it is a form of self-abuse because if we had never constructed the signifier in the first place it would not have its immediate effects upon us. We should begin to see that the topology laid out here is not so much a war between the subject and the object, but rather a war between different assimilations that orient our lives, values and concepts. If we can still make a distinction between assimilations ‘out-there’, and the proliferation of concepts caused and affected by such assimilations ‘in the mind’, then the war is one between assimilations and neuroses. In many ways the traditional ‘subject’ is just another transforming mix of various assimilations (I have spoken before about the various nutritional, linguistic, genealogical and perceptual assimilations that occur in order for us to exist). Standard—almost homeostatic—\textit{neurosis} is simply the experience of being ignorant of (or affirming) all these assimilations and acting upon them impulsively; use for uses sake, custom for custom’s sake^26 (...we will get to neurosis!).

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^24Referencing Walter Benjamin’s characterisation of ‘aura’ in his The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproduction, 1936.


^26This has affinities to Marx and later Marcuse’s theory of ‘objectification’ whereby labourers become dehumanized into functional objects of capital (Marcuse expanded this as labourers identifying themselves as extensions of the objects they were producing). See \textit{One Dimensional Man}, Marcuse, Herbert, Routledge, 2002.
Tautological assimilation undone also describes how objects that we have put somewhere assimilate things beyond our scope as humans (how they assimilate further things we did not put there). Assimilation can shed light on a non-reductive approach to objects. What does a church do (assimilate) without us being conscious of such assimilations? Almost unconsciously, for everyone who works in a church, any cursing would be absent from their discourse. The people working in a church would not question this assimilation (to the point that they would not even consider it an assimilation but an act of free-will not to swear) but to an angst-ridden teenager this assimilation would rise into appearance as a law outside of his own doing (not fitting with his neurosis). A form of mobilization occurs to the angst-ridden teenager, a form of assimilation. Something as simple as cleaning shows this assimilative power also. When we have conceptualized the form and use of a church, through many tautological materials such as mathematics, visual architectural planning, labour etc., never once did we add that we also wanted to clean this ‘church’ everyday. Cleaning is something that interferes and feels insignificant to the concept/use of ‘church’. What demands being cleaned is something outside the use and yet assimilates people (cleaners) and becomes superimposed into a tautology (there is a ‘role’ and ‘use’ for cleaners because of this assimilation). One could go on. The amount of assimilative processes going on between and in objects is startling, and they are subject to change at any time, both simultaneously regardless, and utterly at the whim of, neurosis (the uses and sporadic desires that humans impose on their environment and make meaningful).

Tautological Neurosis Undone

We could describe tautological neurosis undone as having the same two characteristics as tautological assimilation undone:

1

When thoughts still remain active regardless of their use; a child worries about making too much noise even though they are at a birthday party and not at home in the company of their strict parents (I.e the thought has no purchase yet is still thought).

2

Where thoughts think themselves up without ‘permission’ to do so (this is found in the psychological definition of neurosis); the patient diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder perpetually re-lives an experience beyond their will, the nymphomaniac cannot stop the influx of sexual thoughts, the philosopher cannot stop the proliferation of his own thoughts that stemmed from his initial hypothesis/method, that are developing regardless of his will or moral compass.
Let us continue attempting to discern the infinite dynamics between assimilation and neurosis and the external powers outside of tautological assimilation. We know that concepts become objects and objects become concepts through the *techne* of tautology (the creation of an object which reflects its concept, and the creation of a concept which designates its object ‘as’). We know that sometimes these tautologies stay even when we have disregarded them as significant in our lives. We know that they don’t simply stay (stay put) but naturally feed into, compliment, juxtapose and interfere with our other tautological activities. Everything is relational so it would be absurd to think that our present relations to things are not conditioned or inform our earlier relations to things. Hegel’s dialectic\(^{27}\) is a perfectly informed process where relations that condition and propel a putative subject or object are hypostasized as manifesting from their differences (further informing identity). We also know that the mind can maintain signification all by itself. This is discerned in traditional psychology (not in a pejorative way at all) through the term ‘neurosis’. All the mind needs is one object that holds within it the twofold structure of tautology (concept-object), all it needs is one dialectic, one irreconcilable, and from there it can generate whole narratives of neurosis. For the subject under post-traumatic stress disorder a tautology is taking place, a new super-imposed one. The old one does not function anymore; the correlation between X’s younger brother and X watching his death on the battlefield is jarring and inconceivable (shocking). The many ‘uses’/associations of his brother have been terminated by this event (or subsumed into this event). Like an arachnophobic constantly obsessed/distracted by a spider in the corner of his office, not only fear but the repetition of something within experience—whether through compulsive repetition (Freud’s thesis\(^{28}\)), seduction (Baudrillard\(^{29}\)) or curiosity (the neurosis of the rigorous philosopher)—spawns something with its own sovereign power, a power to destroy common-sense tautological ‘reality’ under such neurotic pretences (…. but we soon realise that common-sense reality is also full of such neuroses in the first place). This new tautology—which feels incompatible—is not the stubbornness of one thought repeating itself but rather a thought that constantly finds new relations through this first one; the energy of the concept needs to be fuelled (fed). Now every war scene on television remind (re-minds) X of his brother’s death, every falling snowflake reminds him of that snowy night when his brother was killed etc. Even what appears as unrelated objects and circumstances now appear tied to this tautology somehow. This neurosis is generative and not passive like the blind following of a task/law which commonly stops any alternative thinking process and appears as an old, safe and boring tautology.

An example of where conceptual signification (hence conceptual association) takes precedence: Andrea’s house has been newly fitted with touch control light switches, yet when she enters her house the power of the light switches assimilation

\(^{27}\)See Hegel (1977).

\(^{28}\)See Freud (2003).

have not been registered. Instead she reaches for the old chord which used to activate her living room light. Noting that the chord is not there anymore she reaches for the touch control lights instead. This example is not to say that this is entirely nor autonomously the power of conceptual neurosis which makes her do this—this act could easily be the blind physical or tacit movements of a fully assimilated human—but that she still associates the action of turning on the light (regardless of being victim to a blind custom) shows that it still lingers, that it cannot merely be erased by a newer form of assimilation. That this conceptual reflex happens is enough to endorse its reality. One should ask how far this reflex could go—how incongruent can such reflexes be from their ‘natural’ environment of assimilations? Neurosis qua neurosis, or custom qua custom, is a very different picture of reality, which pushes subjective idealism to the point of horror whilst still existing within a world of things that obtain independently from us. Think of a neurotic second (or third) nature which has eventually coalesced all traces of the assimilative first. For the now redundant tautological objects that aren’t as lucky as the chord that turns on the light (yes there is a type of childish dependency or desire for attention attached to the essence of these objects—because without such attention/use they would seize to exist in a pertinent way) what happens to them? This is similar to asking the question—what happens to those ideas that we designate as redundant, or, what happens to the ideas we repress in the hope that they will not return?

External/Exotic Assimilation (Natural Assimilation) and Its Two Powers of Orientation and Identification

Before I get underway with this brief and impossible section I must state that there is not an unwavering dichotomy between things that have been made by us and things that are natural. I simply use this as an easy introduction to the notion of exotic assimilation. As far as I’m concerned there is no ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’ matter that has not already been pre-figured, a slave to the relations that condition it, or positively and actively interacting with its own actuality. It would seem that exotic assimilation creeps in when we are affected by something (knowingly or unknowingly) which cannot be classified in terms of concept-object-use. This would suggest that such assimilation does not get a look in within the tautological urban world of our man-made environment. However, as I have shown through the many unbound processes that tautology undergoes, the peripheral effects outside of any tautological process (effects which we can aptly call exotic) happen everywhere all the time, in our interaction with ordinary everyday objects and concepts. There is no central ‘use’ within these peripheral encounters of objects and concepts (…well not yet anyway). If they had ‘use’ they would be central, domestic and tautological. This unbinding of use sparks a world of disorientation, strange encounters, the new, and juxtapositions of use that one may describe as neurotic (whether this be a displacement—in thought or in objects—of the usual comforting use of things, a curiosity with its rabid digression from its use etc.). In a sense all true innovation/madness comes from this peripheral world of neurosis/assimilation.
The ideological difference between what we have termed peripheral exotic assimilations, within the tautological world, and what we call Nature, is one of chronology. Simply put, nature manifests regardless of whether we apply a concept-use-object to it or not. It came on the scene long before human consciousness and will hopefully remain long after its demise. It is obvious that we have tried to subsume ‘nature’ into such and such, into an ‘as’—whether through the ‘functions’ we observe in it (mirroring our own sense of tautology onto it), some anthropocentric ‘identity’ (empirical evaluation of a subsistent form/appearance) or simply by practicality (the clearing of nature into tautological processes superimposed on by us).

Although my ‘exotic’ idea of nature has a realist flavour to it, we cannot really say that nature is anything at all but another tautology (binding of concept with object). At best we could say that ‘nature’ is what we designate as that which persists outside of all tautologies. For example, the spider is not aware that it is within ‘nature’. If anything the spider—for its own possibility of existence—lives within a tautology. The spider web is not Other to itself but is itself. Like Kant’s conceptual structure of experience pouring out from the brain, coalescing everything it sees into tautology, so too the spider, from out of its abdomen, pours forth a tautology, a mode that it can live through and by—the spider web (where it sleeps, captures prey, eats, lives). Every organism functions on the disregard of nature and the affirmation of tautology (or ‘home’).

Art, like Nature, is a springboard for a variety of tautologies because of its very irreducibility to all tautologies (its irreducibility to concept-use). This otherness or exoticism—sometimes manifesting merely as the interference of something external to the tautological procedure of a ‘use’—is another form of disorientation, but as soon as we classify this chafing it becomes yet another tautology. This exotic assimilation deserves a category all by itself because it does not necessarily come from within the unbinding of certain uses of objects or concepts but can emerge as exteriority.

Endnote

This obviously leaves out the question “what would it mean to be tautologically neurotic” (not tautologically neurotic undone)? Seeing that tautology in the above paper really means the meshing of both concept and object into ‘use’, assimilative tautology and neurotic tautology could be seen as two sides to the same coin. However, we cannot rule out the idea that concepts might want to serve a pure use unto themselves. Although this is overtly idealistic (what concept exists without some form of object or appearance? I.e what concept manifests without there already being a use—however obscure) the term could mean the desire for all concepts to be useful, for all concepts to act as objects, for everything to make sense, for absolute tautology. In this sense we are not that far away from Plato, Kant and even Hegel. Sometimes our thoughts appear too useful; technology, language and image sometimes appear as barriers buffering what we want to say; I type up a word on my computer too quickly, missing out certain letters, getting “ahead of

cjohns@lincoln.ac.uk
myself’. However this tautological neurosis always end up linked into, dependent upon, the machinery that assimilation assures. The moments of freedom between these two terms are fleeting, like ‘lines-of-flight’, \(^{30}\) and always fall, sink and commensurate into a master-relation/tautology after this ‘singularity’.

The underside to the notion that ideas wish to serve a purpose unto themselves (tautological neurosis), without the interference of external assimilation, is that, once ideas are instantiated in ‘the world’, these ideas may wish to express and develop themselves in relation to their own conceptual history (the narrative and taxonomy of concepts and their relations) as opposed to any demand made by a human in a certain concrete situation, or any superimposed umbrella terms such as ‘humanism’ or ‘morals’ that the human wishes to filter ideas through.

\[\text{Philosophy of Neurosis}\]

Neurosis is what I call the assimilation of information regarding subject and object relations, object and object relations (infinitely all the way down into quantum physics) and finally, in its metaphysical form, it is the assimilation of information regarding assimilation itself (i.e. an attempt to describe a type of substance theory of assimilation). ‘Neurosis’ is a form of assimilation that acts itself out in the human mind; a form of assimilation mediated by concepts that spawn and mutate as content in human consciousness. However, it would seem that the word ‘assimilation’ (and not neurosis) helps readers understand how psychological neurosis could be portrayed or seen as inhabiting the ‘external’ world or the world of the natural sciences, as well as in our own heads and our own projections of obsession onto things, so I will proceed to use the term assimilation.

Assimilation is a coherent word to use for this larger description of neurosis because it suggests two important characteristics; that intentionality—and the phenomena of intentionality—develops through its own momentum (or desire if you will) and not some external or internal ground of all things (such as Newtonian Space-time or Husserl’s ‘intuition’). In-fact, Newtonian space time, under the model of neurosis, would be seen as two possible assimilations. (1) the assimilation of a type of obsession with uniformity and purposiveness (or the need for it to be assimilated in order for other phenomena to appear on this ground) which a species collectively participates in (this type of judgement could be seen as strangely Hegelian and we could say that this participation assimilates—or simulates—a reality). (2) Assimilation as a similar type of collective participation but this time seen as the constant shifting assimilation of atoms, particles, and larger assimilations of these smaller assimilations, that assimilate a type of compromised one-ness/monistic view of reality/nature. This is the same thing as saying that reality is always the final image or the holistic sum of its parts, whereby its internal intricacies (which are infinite,

\(^{30}\)See Deleuze and Guattari (2013).